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Abstract 
The Federal Government spent over $470 billion on procurement in FY 2016. Spending of 
this magnitude creates opportunities for implementing selected national policies. For 
instance, current law requires that low-cost acquisitions be reserved exclusively for small 
business concerns, with qualifying businesses assuming the role of prime contractor. 
However, the pursuit of admirable social goals such as this may not be rational from an 
economic or technical standpoint. 
This report analyzes the distribution of small business procurement across industry sectors 
using data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). We show that a relatively 
small number of large firms dominate the federal contracting landscape in certain sectors, 
such as defense, and account for a significant proportion of procurement spending. 
Accordingly, set-aside policy has a disparate impact on the remainder of the spending, 
concentrating it into certain industry sectors where there are greater opportunities for small 
businesses, limiting free and open competition, and creating a series of unintended 
consequences for government (e.g., contracting and economic inefficiency) and small 
businesses (e.g., uneven and unsustainable growth and barriers to entry into the federal 
contracting space). 
Introduction 
The Federal Government, on average, spent half a trillion dollars annually on 
procurement over the last decade ($470 billion in FY 2016), roughly 40% more than what 
was spent in real terms during the 1990s (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Federal Contract Spending, Action Obligations in $Billions, 1995–2016  
(Analysis of FPDS Data)  
Spending of this magnitude creates opportunities for implementing socio-economic 
policies aimed at promoting small businesses, especially those owned by members of 
historically-disadvantaged groups (i.e., minorities and women). In 1988, Congress began 
requiring that “the President shall annually establish Government-wide goals for 
procurement contracts” at specified minimum percentages of procurement (Beale, 2014). 
The initial government-wide goal for small business procurement was set “at not less than 
20 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards.” In 1997, the goal was raised to 
23%.  
As part of these broad socio-economic goals, the Small Business Act of 1953 
established the Small Business Administration (SBA) to “aid, counsel, assist, and protect the 
interests of small business concerns, to preserve free competitive enterprise, and to 
maintain and strengthen the overall economy of our nation” (SBA 2014). However, as with 
any effort to regulate a complex system, there are unintended consequences. It remains 
unclear whether the current set-aside policy, in its current implementation, represents the 
best strategies for leveraging the capabilities that small businesses can offer.  
This report analyzes the distribution of small businesses procurement across 
industry sectors using data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). We show 
that a relatively small number of large firms dominate the federal contracting landscape in 
certain sectors, such as defense, and account for a significant proportion of procurement 
spending. Accordingly, set-aside policy has a disparate impact on the remainder of the 
spending, concentrating it into certain industry sectors where there are greater opportunities 
for small businesses, limiting free and open competition, and creating a series of unintended 
consequences for government (e.g., contracting and economic inefficiency) and small 
businesses (e.g., uneven and unsustainable growth and barriers to entry into the federal 
contracting space). 
The advantages of small business—innovation and agility—have been recognized 
for decades. Small business is the “driver and engine of growth” and the “lifeblood of our 
economy” (Obama, 2014). However, there are indications that current set-aside policies fall 
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short of their intended objectives: promoting the growth and prosperity of small business, 
improving government acquisitions efficiency, and fostering economic growth.  
Background 
A small business, to qualify as such under SBA requirements, must meet the 
following criteria: 
 Meets SBA industry-specific size standards; 
 Is organized for profit; 
 Has a place of business in the United States; 
 Operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution 
to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, 
materials, or labor; 
 Is independently owned and operated; and 
 Is not dominant in its field on a national basis. (SBA, 2015) 
Current law requires that all acquisitions above the micro-purchase threshold of 
$3,500 be set aside for small business concerns provided that there is a reasonable 
expectation that offers from at least two responsible small business concerns will be 
received at fair market prices. This provision is commonly referred to as the “rule of two.” 
Set-Aside Goals 
In addition, each year the government sets a government-wide small business prime 
contracting goal. The current goal is 23%. It also establishes goals for small-disadvantaged 
businesses, women-owned small businesses, historically-underutilized businesses zones 
(HUBZone), and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. There is also a 
government-wide small business subcontracting goal and subcontracting goals in each of 
the aforementioned categories. The 2015 set-aside goals and levels of achievement are 
shown in Table 1.  




Current law also requires that federal agencies, in collaboration with the SBA, 
establish their own goals biannually in each of the categories listed in Table 1. The goals 
vary widely by agency. Prior to finalizing each agency’s goals, the SBA determines whether 
the goals, in the aggregate, meet or exceed the government-wide statutorily mandated goals 
in each of the categories. The critic might question why agency goals are subordinated to 
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government-wide goals, rather than used to inform, if not justify, the government-wide 
targets. 
The SBA provides each agency with an annual performance scorecard that lists 
achievement in each category along with an overall grade, using a methodology that heavily 
weights prime contracting achievement. An agency’s grade is composed of three 
quantitative measures: prime contracts (80%), subcontracts (10%), and its “progress plan” 
for meeting future goals (10%; SBA, 2015). Accordingly, comparing their letter grades 
cannot reveal which agencies relied more heavily on small business to meet their 
procurement needs. Table 2 shows the DoD’s 2016 small business procurement scorecard. 
Table 2. DoD’s 2016 Small Business Procurement Scorecard 
 
SBA Size Standards 
One of the challenges created by the small business set-aside policies is defining 
what a “small” business is. These definitions are tailored to industry classifications and have 
evolved over time. The SBA devises size standards which are expressed as either the 
average number of over the past 12 months or average annual receipts over the past three 
years. The size standard varies by NAICS industry and is dependent on an SBA 
methodology that analyzes five primary factors within each industry: average firm size, 
degree of competition within an industry, startup costs and entry barriers, distribution of firms 
by size, and small business share in federal contracts. 
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Contracting officers then must classify each and every solicitation by an industry-
level NAICS code that, by their determination, describes the principal purpose of the product 
or service. Accordingly, a business that qualifies as “small” under one or more NAICS codes 
may not qualify under others. As one might imagine, the procuring agency must carefully 
consider each NAICS code designation. Erroneously assigned codes constitute valid ground 
for bid protests, which can be costly for the government. 
However, NAICS code selection can be a subjective endeavor, and can significantly 
affect the companies eligible. McVay (2009) provides an example which would be comical in 
its banality if not for its real-world implications. He writes that “if a contracting officer decides 
to set aside a contract for paperboard boxes, should he categorize the boxes as ‘Setup 
Paperboard Boxes’ (NAICS code 322213), which has a size standard of 500 employees, or 
as ‘Folding Paperboard Boxes’ (NAICS code 322212), which has a size standard of 750 
employees?” (p. 185). 
Small Business Representation in Federal Contracting 
Figure 2 depicts FY 2015 federal contract obligations by industry sector. The first 
thing to notice is that federal procurement is highly concentrated by sector, with 
manufacturing; professional, scientific, and technical services; construction; and 
administrative support accounting for more than 80% of procurement. 
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Figure 2. FY 2015 Total Federal Contract Obligations by Industry Sector  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
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Figure 3. FY 2015 Small Business Federal Contract Obligations by Industry 
Sector  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
Figure 3 depicts small business federal contract obligations by industry sector. 
Though the same four sectors dominate, their relative sizes differ significantly. Two sectors, 
construction and professional, scientific, and technical services account for relatively larger 
pieces of the small business pie; manufacturing accounts for a noticeably smaller piece. 
Figure 4 compares the relative sizes of the four major sectors in each of the two 
procurement spaces (i.e., small business and “other than small business”). 
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Figure 4. Sectoral Composition, Small Business vs. Other Than Small Business, 
Percentage of FY 2015 Action Obligations  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
The Small Business Potential 
Table 3 depicts the relationship between total federal procurement within each sector 
and the small business share within that sector. The table shows, for example, that 4% of all 
federal contract obligations fall within the transportation and warehousing sector. Of that 4%, 
or $16 billion in total federal contract obligations, 17%, or $2.6 billion, is obligated to small 
business.  
Increasing the small business opportunities within the 10 sectors where federal 
procurement is below 1% of the total will have minimal impact on the overall small business 
share, especially given that in eight of these “minor” sectors, small business is already well 
represented. In terms of federal procurement, small business dominates the agricultural 
sector, with 76% of all dollars (in FY 2015) awarded to small business, but this figure 
translates to only $318 million.  
The table makes it clear that any effort to significantly increase the small business 
share of federal contracting dollars must be directed within the first four or five sectors, 
where the overall level of federal procurement is relatively high. However, there are 
challenges in this regard. In the construction sector, for example, nearly half (47%) of all 
contracting dollars already flow to small business, a figure well above SBA’s government-
wide small business contracting goal of 23%. As for manufacturing, the federal government 
spends the bulk of its contracting for manufacturing dollars in highly-specialized industries 
such as aerospace and military manufacturing. These industries require extensive capital 
investment, a large operating footprint, and far-reaching logistics networks.  
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Table 3. Federal Procurement by Sector and the Small Business Share, FY 2015  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
 
Growth of Small Business in the Professional Services Sector 
It seems, then, that the potential for greater small business procurement lies 
primarily in the professional services sectors and, to a (far) lesser extent, the administrative 
support and transportation and warehousing sectors. Figure 5 depicts small business trends 
in the four major sectors over that last decade. 
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Figure 5. Small Business Share (Action Obligations in $Billions) of Federal 
Contract Dollars in the Four Major Sectors  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
In terms of small business representation, the graph indicates steady growth within 
the professional services sector. It is of note that these trends are not necessarily 
representative of federal procurement in general. Figure 6 shows trends in federal 
contracting, excluding small business, in the same four sectors. 
 
Figure 6. Federal Contracting (Action Obligations in $Billions) in the Four Major 
Sectors, Excluding Small Business  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
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Figure 7. Small Business Participation in Federal Contracting, Professional 
Services Sector, Percentage of Action Obligations, $  
(Analysis of FPDS Data)  
It is clear that small business has lost ground in the construction and manufacturing 
sectors, but has gained steadily in the professional, scientific, and technical services sector. 
Figure 7 shows the growth of the small business share of federal contracting dollars in the 
professional services sector over the last decade, from 15% in 2006 to 29% in 2016.  
As Table 3 indicated, within the context of federal contracting, there are very few 
industry sectors capable of providing significant new opportunities for small businesses. 
Accordingly, and as recent trends suggest, SBA set-aside policy will have the effect of 
concentrating more federal contract spending into the growing professional services sector.  
Unintended Consequences 
In this section, we highlight the unintended consequences that derive from 
concentrating small business contract spending into the professional services sector. For 
small firms, these include uneven and unsustainable growth and significant barriers to entry; 
for government, unintended consequences take the form of contracting and economic 
inefficiency. 
In an effort to contextualize our findings, we present the perspectives of professional 
services providers (small and mid-size) as well as government officials. In both cases, their 
identities have been anonymized in order to solicit candid responses. 
It should be noted upfront that all of the participants conveyed a favorable view of the 
concept of small business set asides. One small firm remarked that its view of set asides 
was 
absolutely positive. … It allows us to compete on a more level playing field. I 
think it’s been a great program. You look at the numbers of small businesses 
in the United States, [and] you hear time and time again that so much of the 
income and GDP comes from small businesses.  
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Another noted that “if you didn’t have set asides, then you wouldn’t be able to seed 
companies.” However, when it came to the specific content of set-aside policy and its 
implementation, perspectives were more nuanced.  
Uneven and Unsustainable Growth 
Set-asides may induce the small business to grow more rapidly than it otherwise 
would. This growth may be uneven and unsustainable. Because the small business is not 
able to develop adequate depth in the provision of capabilities and other business functions 
in such short order, large contracts have the potential to overwhelm its infrastructure and 
capacity. This is an increasingly likely outcome given that small businesses are also being 
awarded both a higher number and greater percentage of large contracts in the professional 
services sector (see Figure 8), a trend that is not seen in small business procurement 
generally. In 2006, small business received approximately 5% of contracts over $25 million; 
by 2016, the figure increased to over 16%. 
One mid-size business with whom we spoke offered the following perspective: 
Right now, [government agencies] are just managing against numbers. 
They’re managing against quotas and objectives. I think that what’s needed is 
a healthy step back to try to understand what is it we’re trying to accomplish. I 
don’t mind having small businesses get a priority for some prime contracts, 
but having a small business award that is a hundred million or two hundred 
million a year is just ludicrous. It’s totally ludicrous. 
 
Figure 8. Number of Large Contracts (> $25 Million) Awarded Annually in the 
Professional Services Sector 
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
As successful small businesses increase their annual revenues, graduating from 
certain NAICS codes, they must look to compete for government set-asides in other 
industries, often those whose size standards are expressed in number of employees. There 
are three NAICS codes in the professional services with size standards expressed in 
number of employees: research and development in biotechnology (1,000); research and 
development in the physical, engineering, and life sciences (1,000); and information 
technology value added resellers (1,000).  
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However, this transition may require that the small business reorient its business 
model, relinquishing the sought-after capabilities that made it successful in the first place. 
Clearly, this outcome represents a loss to both the firm and the government. 
One small firm, whose yearly revenues recently began to exceed the 27.5 million 
size standard, had this to say:  
[In areas such as] software development, cybersecurity, [and] IT networking, 
we have to look to basically be a sub. We can’t really compete for that work 
any longer, even [with regard to] our prime contract today … we can’t re-
compete for our own work there because of the NAICS code [size standards]. 
Indeed, this same firm decided to reorient its business model in order to pursue 
contracts in other NAICS codes:  
We’re focusing now on other parts of our business where we do engineering 
services work, [which has] a higher NAICS code and research and 
development programs. [But] these potential prime opportunities … require a 
business shift for us as far as the talent that we have on board. All IT people 
aren’t necessarily R&D people. 
Another option, of course, is to compete in the full and open category alongside 
established mid-size firms and defense industry giants. Often, graduating small businesses 
are not well positioned to succeed in this environment. According to Representative Gerald 
Connolly (D-VA): “Innovative, high performing small businesses are becoming victims of 
their own success—graduating from small business programs only to find themselves in the 
untenable position of facing off against multi-billion dollar firms” (Weigelt, 2013). 
Some small businesses may pursue yet another option: choose to limit growth and 
remain small to avoid disqualifying themselves for small business set-aside contracts. 
Rather than pursue growth and diversification so as to become independent and financially 
robust, they remain dependent on subsidized federal contracts to survive. These 
“permanent small businesses” may become quite adept in this environment over time. 
According to one small business executive: 
I met with another small business owner … and you won’t believe this. He 
said “I’m in it for the nine years. I’m a retired army guy and I’ve also got a 
background so that I can be a [small disadvantaged business]. My intent is to 
grow it for nine years, make all the money I can and then let it die.” 
Needless to say, this outcome is antithetical to the SBA set-aside program’s primary 
goal to encourage small businesses to hire more employees and grow.  
Barriers to Entry 
As discussed, SBA polices create market distortions by, in effect, mandating that 
federal agencies look increasingly to small business to fulfill their professional services 
requirements in order to meet SBA targets, thereby creating artificial demand for small 
businesses within this sector. As a result, there are more small businesses vying for a share 
of the overall spend, which has hindered contracting agencies’ ability to effectively and 
efficiently contract for services. Agencies must spend more time reviewing more proposals 
from small businesses with which agencies may be unfamiliar. Complicating matters further 
is the shortage of experienced acquisition professionals. A retired senior Air Force 
contracting official summarized his perspective on acquisition personnel as follows: 
There is an obvious challenge when you take people who do not possess the 
depth of experience and you rush them into positions commensurate with 
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elders who have held 15 years’ worth of experience before they came into the 
same position. There are some obvious challenges with experience level, 
education and training. There are institutions out there that are trying to tackle 
those challenges, but textbooks and classroom training can simply not 
replace repetition and experience. 
In an effort to circumvent the lengthy solicitation process, government agencies have 
turned increasingly to multiple-award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts 
(MA/IDIQ), often in the form of Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (e.g., the GSA’s 
OASIS and Alliant contracts) or single-agency multiple award contracts (e.g., the Air Force’s 
NETCENTS). Total procurement obligations under multiple-award contracts exceeded $80 
billion in 2011, double the amount in 2006 (Robinson, 2013).  
Another reason that the government has turned to MA/IDIQs is to avoid bid 
protests—i.e., a challenge to the award of a contract, typically lodged by a competitor—
which have increased significantly over the last decade from 1,352 to 2,561 in 2014 (GAO, 
2015). In fact, the number of annual bid protests ticked up by 5% alone in 2014, an increase 
that is not insignificant, considering the overall decrease in procurement spending (Burton, 
2015).  
Often, agencies rely on two variants of a contract, one that is reserved exclusively for 
small business participation and one that is “unrestricted.” Small businesses that are 
awarded MA/IDIQ contracts compete against other small businesses for individual task 
orders placed by government customers. These customers often view MA/IDIQ contracts as 
“one stop shops” that enable them to quickly and easily meet both their professional 
services needs and their SBA-negotiated small business goals. 
But because MA/IDIQs tend to have relatively long periods of performance, often up 
to five years, and few “on ramps,” the contracts tend to limit participation. In essence, they 
create a few winners, but many other small firms are shut out. A government contract officer 
with whom we spoke asserted that “SBSAs are giving small businesses work, but you have 
to be among the select few; there are some winners but there will be a lot of losers.” 
According to one small defense firm,  
There are 80,000 small businesses [capable of] supporting DoD and you’ve 
got [only] 129 of them on OASIS. And the Army, Navy, and Air Force have 
decided all of their services work is going to OASIS. How does that support 
the small business industrial base? It kills it. That to me, I think, is tied to the 
number of protests and I think its tied to shortages in contracting officers and 
agencies that are so tired of dealing with all the regulations that they’re 
looking for an easy way out. 
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Ironically, firms that win these coveted MA/IDIQs may not view them all that 
favorably because they are required to, in effect, bid twice—once for the contract and again 
for subsequent task orders—a process that can be onerous and expensive, especially for a 
small business. And, ultimately increasing overhead rates, that will be passed on to 
government customers. 
One small firm executive categorized MA/IDIQ contracts as a “serious money drain,” 
and stated that  
we shy away from those [MA/IDIQ contracts] tremendously. Multiple reasons. 
One reason is that it runs up B&P [bid and proposal] costs. You’re in proposal 
mode constantly. Also, we’ve seen most of those contracts go back to the 
incumbents’ time and time again. [And with] MA/IDIQs, there’s no protest. It’s 
not a friendly place for us to play. 
MA/IDIQ contracts are not often structured to facilitate a small firm’s growth. One firm 
with whom we spoke used to provide customized IT solutions through the Alliant GWAC. 
The firm noted that it had been “very successful on that contract.” However, by the end of 
the contract’s period of performance, the company had exceeded the $27.5 million size 
standard. According to the firm,  
We were no longer able to use that vehicle with which we were very 
successful. And there was no alternative. They didn’t allow you on to what 
you might call the unrestricted, or the large business contract. They just said 
you’re out, as if you had never won. 
This firm’s vice president noted that its revenues in FY 2014 and FY 2015 stood at 
$82 and $84 million, respectively. He stated that “this year we will close at $50; next year we 
will probably close below that.” 
To be sure, MA/IDIQ contracts can offer benefits to small business awardees that 
traditional contracts cannot. According to 13 CFR 121.404 “If a business is small at the time 
of offer for the Multiple Award Contract, it is small for each order issued against the 
contract.” Moreover, where a concern grows to be other than small, the procuring agency 
may exercise options and still count the award as an award to a small business. 
Accordingly, a small business that exceeds the relevant size standard upon winning one or 
two task orders can continue to compete throughout the life of the contract, which may span 
five, or even ten, years.  
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Take, for example, Amyx, a small business founded in 1999. The firm averaged 
approximately $10 million per year in federal contracts between 2010 and 2013. The firm 
was one of the first awardees of the OASIS Small Business contract (Pool 1) when it was 
launched in 2013. In January of 2017, Amyx was awarded its fifth task order under Oasis 
valued at $189 million over five years. During the same time, Amyx was awarded other 
large, high-profile, contracts by the DLA. Despite having exceeded the relevant size 
standard, Amyx will continue to be able to compete for task orders in Pool 1 ($14 million size 
standard) over the course of the next seven years (Thompson, 2015). 
To some, this is seen as patently unfair—as evidence that MA/IDIQs in particular, 
and SBA policy generally, favor a small cadre of successful firms at the expense of a much 
larger group that feels “shut out” from some of the federal government’s most lucrative 
contracts. However, permitting “mid-sized” firms to compete for small business task orders 
under MA-IDIQs might be viewed as an apt retort to the criticism that MA/IDIQs fail to 
facilitate firms’ growth. What is clear, however, is that the consolidation of contracts into 
MA/IDIQs, especially GWACs, has widened the gulf between the haves and have-nots, the 
winners and the losers. 
Contracting and Economic Inefficiency 
Critics have asserted that the timing of small business awards—concentrated at the 
end of the fiscal year—represents agencies’ attempts to meet their annual contracting goals 
and/or obligate remaining agency funds (see Figure 9). By taking advantage of set-aside 
policy to bypass lengthy sourcing, agencies are able to obligate their remaining funds 
quickly. One small business with whom we spoke provided the following perspective:  
You know that the fiscal year ends for the government in September 30. You 
also know that the federal government is not a business where they earn 
profit or a return on investment—their goal is to spend all of their money as 
fast as they can, so that they can continue to get the same level of funding. 
So when they get to around the August timeframe, they realize how much 
money they have left. If there are some things that they are interested in and 
a small business is able to bring that value to them, they can quickly put a 
sole source out and get rid of that money. 
Needless to say, efforts made to spend funds quickly likely fail to maximize taxpayer 
value, representing yet another unintended outcome of set-aside policy. 
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Figure 9. Timing of Contract Awards ($), 10-Year Average, 2007–2016  
(Analysis of FPDS Data) 
NAICS code selection can be another source of inefficiency. With the increasing 
pressure to meet the small business set-aside goals, agencies, on occasion, use an 
inappropriate NAICS code. In fact, the term “code shopping” has emerged to describe 
agencies’ attempts to use NAICS codes with larger size standards, ostensibly in an effort to 
attract larger small business, with enough staff to meet user requirements, yet still meet their 
small business contracting goals. Because NAICS codes within the professional services 
sector tend to be more open to subjective interpretation than codes in other sectors, and 
because professional services firms often provide diverse and varied services under a single 
contract, there is greater potential for code shopping within the growing professional 
services sector. 
Set-aside policy also creates the potential for significant economic inefficiency within 
the professional services sector. As one mid-sized business executive observes, 
The government is always prone, when it hears about any inequities, to 
create more categories, more numbers, more demographic barriers, or 
segments. We continue to see the proliferation of size standards and 
demographic categories. At some point you have to ask, does the creation of 
these categories become counterproductive? By segmenting the industry 
space, do you force turbulence? Do you force unnecessary churn in the 
market? 
With the current set-aside policy, mid-size and large professional have fewer 
opportunities. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study concluded that 
mid-size firms (these were defined as firms which are too large to be categorized as small 
but had less than $3 billion in total annual revenue) were being “squeezed” out of DoD 
contracts by both large and small contractors. CSIS found that from 1999 to 2009, the share 
of DoD contracts awarded to small businesses increased (from 17.0% to 17.4%) and to 
large firms increased (from 47.0% to 53.7%), while the share awarded to these mid-size 
firms decreased (from 36.0% to 28.9%; CSIS 2012).  
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Regarding the concentration of small firms in the professional services sector, a mid-
sized defense firm with whom we spoke offered the following perspective: 
It doesn’t make sense to have all of our services business go to small 
business, because quite candidly, I’m not sure what that really does for the 
nation. To all of a sudden have these body shops that are now small 
businesses … well, these businesses often struggle. 
The firm commented that its defense customers began to turn to small businesses in 
2012 and 2013, when the government placed renewed emphasis on meeting set-aside 
goals. The firm noted that 
as our contracts came up for re-compete, our customers were very up front 
about it. They said, “Hey, we don’t want to go small business, we don’t think it 
makes any sense. But we are being forced to go small business.” So we saw 
a very significant squeeze. A contract may have had 20 or 30 of our people 
and now it’s up for re-compete; all of a sudden, it’s going to be a small 
business contract. 
The intent of the small business set-aside programs is to grow small, and, in many 
cases, disadvantaged businesses to become competitors for additional contracts. As the 
awards grow in size, the small firms are forced to team with a larger firm as a sub-
contractor. When these companies exist simply as shells or as “pass-throughs,” they fail to 
meet the objectives of the SBSA program. According to a senior defense official:  
Anytime the small business is working in name only, this causes the DoD to 
simply pay a mark-up fee of 2% to 8%. This is detrimental and unfair to the 
taxpayer when we blindly give work to smalls, and this happens a lot because 
the government focuses on excessive amount of small businesses, that’s 
when you get the shell companies to emerge.  
Findings and Recommendations 
Small business procurement is not evenly distributed across industry sectors; rather, 
it is increasingly concentrated in a few sectors, including, most notably, the professional 
services sectors. Consequently, small business set-aside policy, in its current 
implementation, yields negative consequences for small business and for government.  
Findings 
 Often, agencies’ small business contracting goals must be met by 
“overspending” in the professional services sector, which creates artificial 
demand for small professional services providers, while “squeezing out” 
established, and often better qualified, mid-sized and large firms. 
 SBA policies have clearly facilitated the growth in the award going to small 
businesses, however uneven or, at times, unsustainable. However, the 
rationale or methodology for developing the goals, if one exists, is not well 
understood. Additionally, since current revenues form the basis of future size 
standard determinations, many growing industries within the professional 
services sector will be subjected to upward revisions, thereby raising the 
barriers to new entrants, perhaps hindering innovation. 
 When small professional services providers receive larger contracts, their 
growth trajectory is accelerated, such that they are often no longer eligible for 
set-asides; these providers frequently lack the capability and infrastructure to 
compete under free and open competition. 
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 Agency set-aside goals encourage a trend whereby small business must 
subcontract with a large business that will perform work in areas where the 
small business has limited capabilities. In some instances, the small business 
acts as “a pass-through” that offers limited or even negative value to 
government. 
 The proliferation of small firms in the professional services sector, combined 
with a declining acquisition workforce, has fueled increased reliance on 
multiple award contracts, which favor a select group of small firms, but “shut 
out” the majority. 
 In an effort to meet small business goals, agencies may resort to “code 
shopping” in an effort to obtain the best of both worlds: the services of a 
larger, more qualified, “small” business and credit towards their small 
business contracting goals. 
 When government agencies need to obligate funding quickly, they turn to 
small business contracting, a practice that may not obtain government best 
value. 
 The complex regulatory environment, especially within the DoD, SBA size 
standards (revenue or number of employees) for small business that vary 
across more than one thousand industries, in addition to goals for prime and 
subcontracting that differ by agency and type of small business (e.g., 
minority-owned, women-owned, etc.) all require a large bureaucracy that is 
maintained at taxpayer expense. 
Based on our analysis of FPDS data and our examination of the unintended 
consequences that derive from set-aside policy, we offer the following 
recommendations.  
Recommendations 
Set Realistic Numeric Agency Goals 
The Small Business Administration should develop an understandable, rational, and 
transparent, methodology to establish numeric agency small business goals. Consideration 
should be given to the development of a single goal, that would include both prime and 
subcontract dollars; adjusting the calculation and grading methodology to account for small 
business firms participating at all tiers of the agency contracts. 
Encourage the Best Small Businesses to Grow 
Small business set-aside program must be structured to encourage the best firms to 
grow. To accomplish this, there must be enough opportunities for these firms to compete 
when they graduate. 
Improve Data Gathering and Program Metrics 
It is impossible to understand the full impact of any program without reliable data and 
metrics. Currently, the small business set-aside program focuses on achieving the numerical 
goals for small business contracting. However, it is difficult to assess the costs that this 
program may impose, and how successful the program is in achieving the program’s overall 
objectives (e.g., job creation, innovation, growth, etc.), that is, the program’s outcomes. 
Use Set-Asides for Acquisitions Only When Small Business Can Handle Them 
When given the appropriate contracts, small businesses can successfully perform 
as, or more, efficiently than a large business. The key is selecting the suitable opportunities 
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that are within the scope and scale of the small business, so that selecting a small business 
prime does not create a risk of poor performance. Small business set-asides are suitable 
when they enable a firm to grow, but do not overwhelm its infrastructure or capabilities. 
Awarding a contract to a firm that is beyond its capacity will cause the company to have 
difficulty with that work, and may cause it to fail. Agencies should refrain from awarding large 
contracts that approach or exceed the industry size standard. Large contracts have the 
potential to overwhelm small firms’ infrastructure and capabilities. Moreover, these contracts 
prematurely hasten a small firm’s growth trajectory, often to point where the firm is no longer 
eligible to receive set-asides. 
Review NAICS Code Thresholds  
The SBA has defined these size standards for groups of industry. When these 
groups are too broad, the codes can provide enough ambiguity so that an inappropriate 
code (and as a result size standards) can be used. This results in an inappropriate set of 
firms that are subsidized, and the intended recipients are not eligible. These thresholds must 
be clear and unambiguous.  
Review the Use of Multiple Award/IDIQ Contracts 
Reliance on IDIQ vehicles as convenient tools for flexible contracting has helped 
reduce the transaction costs associated with many programs. However, IDIQ 
contracts have the potential to limit overall competition since potential vendors are 
preselected. Small businesses that are not awarded IDIQs in their industry are 
effectively “shut out” of some of the federal government’s most lucrative contracts. 
Those fortunate enough to be awarded IDQs face high bid and proposal costs 
(relative to traditional contract solicitations) in that they must bid on the initial 
contract and then again for each individual task order placed under that contract). 
For small businesses with limited means, these costs may prove prohibitive, creating 
barriers to entry and constraining innovation.  
Conclusion 
As Milton Friedman once remarked, “One of the great mistakes is to judge policies 
and programs by their intentions rather than their results.” Current federal policy with respect 
to small business set-asides was formed, and is implemented, with the best of intentions. 
However, as with many policy initiatives, there can be unintended consequences. The 
government must strike a balance that encourages the growth of innovative small 
businesses while ensuring that its contracting needs are met in a way that is responsible, 
effective, and efficient. Small business set-aside policy, in its current implementation, may 
not strike the optimal balance. 
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